

ANNEX 15 to

Prosecution request to amend the Exhibit List

Public

CIA Report on Kosova Liberation Army
in response to Engel Amendment
to FY 2000 Intelligence Authorization bill (Sec. 312)

P.L. 106-120

LAWS OF 106th CONG.—1st SESS.

Dec. 3

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT

SEC. 312. REPORT ON KOSOVA LIBERATION ARMY.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report (in both classified and unclassified form) on the organized resistance in Kosovo known as the Kosova Liberation Army. The report shall include the following:

(1) A summary of the history of the Kosova Liberation Army.

(2) As of the date of the enactment of this Act—

(A) the number of individuals currently participating in or supporting combat operations of the Kosova Liberation Army (fielded forces), and the number of individuals in training for such service (recruits);

(B) the types, and quantity of each type, of weapon employed by the Kosova Liberation Army, the training afforded to such fielded forces in the use of such weapons, and the sufficiency of such training to conduct effective military operations; and

(C) minimum additional weaponry and training required to improve substantially the efficacy of such military operations.

(3) An estimate of the percentage of funding (if any) of the Kosova Liberation Army that is attributable to profits from the sale of illicit narcotics.

(4) A description of the involvement (if any) of the Kosova Liberation Army in terrorist activities.

(5) A description of the number of killings of noncombatant civilians (if any) carried out by the Kosova Liberation Army since its formation.

(6) A description of the leadership of the Kosova Liberation Army, including an analysis of—

(A) the political philosophy and program of the leadership; and

(B) the sentiment of the leadership toward the United States.

(b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—As used in this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

3 January 2000

Report on the Kosovo Liberation Army

1. Summary History of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

The *Ushtria Clirimtare E Kosoves (UCK)*, or the Kosovo Liberation Army, was formed in the early 1990s with the goal of using force to create an independent Kosovo and, ultimately, a “Greater Albania” that would unite ethnic Albanians in Albania, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. A secretive organization with access to light infantry weapons and small amounts of explosives, the UCK in 1996 launched a guerrilla campaign of bombings and hit-and-run attacks against Serb government facilities and personnel, as well as ethnic Albanians it suspected of collaboration with Serb authorities.

UCK attacks had only a limited impact on Serb forces in Kosovo, and the group remained a marginal force in the Kosovo Albanian autonomy movement. However, the deaths of 80 Kosovo Albanians, including many women and children, during a March 1998 raid by Serb security forces on a suspected UCK compound in central Kosovo galvanized support for armed resistance among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and the diaspora. The UCK seized the leadership of the growing insurgency and expanded quickly in the following months—in part due to the ready availability of large numbers of weapons and military equipment looted from Albanian Army stores during the previous year and a willingness of Kosovo Albanians to volunteer for service.

Despite its growing strength, the UCK was unable to counter the Yugoslav Army offensive that started in March 1999. UCK units attempted to defend villages and protect ethnic Albanian civilians throughout Kosovo, but were overwhelmed by the Serbs’ superior firepower. The deployment of international military forces into Kosovo in June 1999, however, brought an end to the fighting. The UCK agreed to demilitarize and transform into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a non-military organization with civil defense duties, such as emergency rescue and disaster relief. KFOR officials in late August certified the UCK was compliant with the demilitarization requirements, and the UCK officially disbanded in late September 1999.

2. *As of the date of the enactment of this Act...*

A. *The number of individuals currently participating in or supporting combat operations of the UCK (fielded forces), and the number of individuals in training for such service (recruits).*

Currently there are no UCK forces participating in or supporting combat operations. The UCK as an organization no longer exists, and its successor, the KPC, is not conducting any military-style training. Most UCK members returned to civilian life when KFOR deployed to the province, although a few thousand have applied to become

members of the KPC, with several hundred others applying for the Kosovo Police Service (KPS).

B. The types, and quantity of each type, of weapon employed by the UCK, the training afforded to such fielded forces in the use of such weapons, and the sufficiency of such training to conduct effective military operations.

The KFOR commander certified that the former UCK had complied with demilitarization requirements of storing weapons in approved sites. The agreement establishing the KPC allows that organization to maintain 2,000 sidearms and assault rifles, with 200 weapons in use at any one time. Prior to demilitarization, the UCK possessed an unknown quantity of assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, large-caliber sniper rifles, and anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines.

The UCK as an organization no longer exists, and its successor, the KPC, is not conducting any military-style training.

C. Minimum additional weaponry and training required to improve substantially the efficacy of such military operations.

Former UCK members would require substantial quantities of anti-armor and anti-aircraft weapons to conduct effective military operations. They also would need training of all types—including basic marksmanship, tactical maneuver, and leadership. During several engagements with Serb military forces in late 1998 and early 1999, the UCK proved unable to stop Serb assaults supported by armored vehicles and artillery.

3. Estimate of the percentage of funding (if any) of the UCK that is attributable to profits from the sale of illicit narcotics.

The UCK leadership does not appear to have engaged in narcotics operations to support its activities during the war. Press reporting of various degrees of reliability indicates that some members of the former UCK are involved in narcotics smuggling, but we have no information on the scale of these activities.

4. A description of the involvement (if any) of the UCK in terrorist activities.

The UCK was not involved in terrorist activities—defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets.

5. A description of the number of killings of noncombatant civilians (if any) carried out by the UCK since its formation.

We do not have a definitive count of the number of noncombatant civilians killed by the UCK since its formation. The UCK primarily targeted Serb government personnel and facilities, as well as ethnic Albanians who were suspected of collaborating with Serb authorities. However, press reports suggest that some UCK members have been involved in intimidation attacks and retribution killings since Serb forces withdrew from the province in June 1999.

6. *A description of the leadership of the UCK, including an analysis of...*

A. The political philosophy and program of the leadership.

The former UCK leadership continues to call for the independence of Kosovo. During the war, the leadership ceased public calls for a "Greater Albania." Beyond independence and economic reconstruction, the former UCK leadership has revealed little of its political platform.

B. The sentiment of the leadership toward the United States.

Former UCK leaders look favorably toward the United States as the driving force for the NATO air campaign against Serb security forces last spring.